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ABSTRACT
An increasing amount of sensitive information today is stored elec-
tronically and a substantial part of this information (e.g., health
records, tax data, legal documents) must be retained over long time
periods (e.g., several decades or even centuries). When sensitive
data is stored, then integrity and confidentiality must be protected
to ensure reliability and privacy. Commonly used cryptographic
schemes, however, are not designed for protecting data over such
long time periods. Recently, the first storage architecture combining
long-term integrity with long-term confidentiality protection was
proposed (AsiaCCS’17). However, the architecture only deals with
a simplified storage scenario where parts of the stored data cannot
be accessed and verified individually. If this is allowed, however,
not only the data content itself, but also the access pattern to the
data (i.e., the information which data items are accessed at which
times) may be sensitive information.
Here we present the first long-term secure storage architecture
that provides long-term access pattern hiding security in addition
to long-term integrity and long-term confidentiality protection.
To achieve this, we combine information-theoretic secret shar-
ing, renewable timestamps, and renewable commitments with an
information-theoretic oblivious random access machine. Our per-
formance analysis of the proposed architecture shows that achiev-
ing long-term integrity, confidentiality, and access pattern hiding
security is feasible.
1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Problem Statement
Large amounts of sensitive data (e.g., health records, governmental
documents, enterprise documents, land registries, tax declarations)
are stored in cloud-based data centers and require integrity and con-
fidentiality protection over long time periods (e.g., several decades
or even centuries). Here, by integrity we mean that illegitimate
changes to the data can be discovered and by confidentiality we
mean that only authorized parties can access the data.
Typically, cryptographic signature and encryption schemes (e.g.,
RSA [24] and AES [23]) are used to ensure data integrity and confi-
dentiality. However, the security of currently used cryptographic
schemes relies on computational assumptions (e.g., that the prime
factors of a large integer cannot be computed efficiently). Such
schemes are called computationally secure. Due to technological
progress, however, computers are becoming more powerful over
time and computational assumptions made today are likely to break
at some point in the future (e.g., factoring large integers will be
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possible using quantum computers). Thus, commonly used crypto-
graphic schemes, which rely on a single computational assumption,
are insufficient for protecting data over long periods of time (e.g.,
decades or even centuries).
To enable long-term integrity protection, Bayer et al. [1] pro-
posed a method for renewing digital signatures by using time-
stamps. Following their approach, several other schemes had been
developed of which [31] gives an overview. It should be noted that
only recently the concrete security of these schemes has been in-
vestigated and proven [6, 7, 11]. While these results indicate that
integrity protection can be renewed using timestamps, it appears en-
tirely infeasible to prolong confidentiality. The reason is that once
a ciphertext generated by a computationally secure encryption
scheme is observed by an attacker, the attacker can always break
the encryption using brute-force and a sufficiently large amount of
computational resources over time. While honey encryption [18]
can help against brute-force attacks in some scenarios, the only
rigorous way to provide long-term confidentiality protection is
to use information-theoretically secure schemes, as their security
does not rely on computational assumptions. Information-theoretic
solutions exist for many cryptographic tasks. For example, secure
data storage can be realized using secret sharing [17, 25] and se-
cure communication can be realized by combining Quantum Key
Distribution [12] with One-Time-Pad Encryption [26]. We refer the
reader to [4] for an overview of techniques relevant to long-term
confidentiality protection. Recently, the first storage system that
combines long-term integrity with long-term confidentiality pro-
tection has been proposed by Braun et al. [3]. They achieve this by
combining secret sharing with renewable timestamps and uncon-
ditionally hiding commitments. However, their scheme does not
allow for accessing and verifying parts of the stored data separately.
Here we consider a setting where the database consists of a list of
blocks and each data block can be retrieved and verified separately.
In this setting, however, not only the data content may be regarded
as sensitive information, but also the access pattern to the data (i.e.,
which data blocks are accessed at which times). For example, if
genome data is stored and accessed at a subset of locations S that
are known to be associated with a certain property X , then it is
likely that the person accessing the data is concerned with X . In
such a scenario it is desirable not only to ensure the confidentiality
of the data content, but also to ensure the confidentiality of the
data access pattern.
1.2 Contribution
In this paper we solve the problem of long-term secure data stor-
age with access pattern hiding security by presenting the storage
architecture PROPYLA.
Long-term integrity and long-term confidentiality protection
in PROPYLA are achieved similar as in [3]. Confidential data is
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stored at a set of shareholders using information-theoretic secure
secret sharing and integrity protection is achieved by combining
renewable commitments with renewable timestamps. An evidence
service helps the user with maintaining integrity protection and
renewing the protection when necessary.
We now explain how we additionally achieve long-term access
pattern hiding security. The main idea is to integrate an information
theoretically secure oblivious random access machine (ORAM) [13]
with the shareholders and the evidence service so that none of these
storage servers learns the access pattern of the client. The challenge
here is to ensure that even under composition the individual secu-
rity properties (i.e., renewable integrity protection, information-
theoretic confidentiality, and information-theoretic access pattern
hiding security) are preserved. To preserve information-theoretic
access pattern hiding security, the data flows induced by any two
different database accesses must be indistinguishable from the view-
point of any of the storage servers. Typically, this is solved by using
an ORAM in combination with shuffling and re-encrypting the
accessed data blocks. This approach, however, cannot be directly
applied in our case, as here commitments are stored at the evidence
service which must be timestamped and therefore cannot be stored
encrypted. We solve the problem of obfuscating the reshuffling
by employing a recommitment technique that enables us to re-
fresh commitments while maintaining their binding property. With
regard to the secret shareholders it is sufficient to regenerate the se-
cret shares on every data access in order to obfuscate the data block
shuffling. This ensures that there is no correlation between the
received and stored data blocks, and thus the shuffling of the data
blocks cannot be traced. We also analyze the security of PROPYLA
and show it indeed achieves long-term integrity, long-term con-
fidentiality, and long-term access pattern hiding security. Finally,
we evaluate the performance of PROPYLA and show that storage,
computation, and communication costs appear manageable.
1.3 Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we state prelim-
inaries. In Section 3, we describe our long-term secure storage
architecture PROPYLA. In Section 4, we analyze its security and in
Section 5, we evaluate its performance.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Time-Stamping
A timestamp scheme [15] consists of an algorithm Setup, a protocol
Stamp executed between a client C and a timestamp service TS,
and an algorithm VerTs with the following properties.
Setup(): At initialization, the timestamp service TS runs this
algorithm and outputs a public verification key pk .
Stamp: On input a data object dat, the client runs this protocol
with the timestamp server. When the protocol has finished,
the client obtained a timestamp ts for dat, where ts.t denotes
the time associated with the timestamp.
VerTspk (dat, ts): Given the public key of the timestamp service,
on input a data object dat and a timestamp ts, this algorithm
returns 1, if the timestamp is valid for dat, and 0 otherwise.
A timestamp scheme is secure if it is infeasible for an adversary to
generate a timestamp ts and a data object dat such that ts is valid
for dat and dat did not exist at time ts.t . This security notion is
formalized in [8–10].
2.2 Commitments
A commitment scheme is the digital analog of a sealed envelope
and allows to commit to a messagem without revealing it. It con-
sists of the algorithms Setup, Commit, and VerCom, that have the
following properties.
Setup(): This algorithm is run by a trusted party and generates
the public commitment parameters cp.
Commitcp (dat): Given the commitment parameters cp, on in-
put a data object dat, this algorithm outputs a commitment
c , and a decommitment d .
VerComcp (dat, c,d) Given the commitment parameters cp, on
input a data object dat, a commitment c , and a decommitment
d , this algorithm outputs 1 if d is a valid decommitment from
c to dat and 0 if it is invalid.
A commitment scheme is secure if it is hiding and binding. Hiding
means that a commitment does not reveal anything about the mes-
sage and binding means that a committer cannot decommit to a
different message. Here, we are interested in information theoreti-
cally hiding and computationally binding commitments. For a more
formal description of commitment schemes we refer to [14, 16].
2.3 Proactive Secret Sharing
A proactive secret sharing scheme [17] allows a client C to share a
secret among a set of shareholders SH such that less than a thresh-
old number of shareholder cannot learn the secret. It is defined by
protocols Setup, Share, Reshare, and Reconstruct.
Setup: In this protocol the client and the shareholders establish
the system parameters.
Share: This protocol is run between the client and the share-
holders. The client takes as input a data object dat and after
the protocol has ended each shareholder holds a share of the
data.
Reshare: This protocol is run periodically between the share-
holders. The shareholders take as input their shares and after
the protocol is finished, the shareholders have obtained new
shares which are not correlated with the old shares. This
protects against a mobile adversary who compromises one
shareholder after another over time.
Reconstruct: This protocol is run between the shareholders
and the client. The shareholders take as input their shares
and after the protocol is finished the client outputs the re-
constructed data object dat. If the reconstruction fails, the
client outputs ⊥.
A secret sharing scheme is secure if no information about the secret
is leaked given that at least a threshold number of shareholders
is not corrupted. The threshold is usually determined in the setup
phase and in some schemes can be changed during the resharing
phase.
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2.4 Oblivious RAM
An oblivious random access machine (ORAM) [13] allows a client to
access a remotely stored database such that the storage server does
not learn which data items are of current interest to the client. Here
we assume that the client’s data consists of N blocks of equal size
and each block is associatedwith a unique identifier id ∈ {1, . . . ,N }.
The server holds a database of sizeM > N blocks and each block
in the server database is identified by a location i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}.
A (stash-free) ORAM is defined by algorithms Setup, GenAP, and
GetId with the following properties.
Setup(N ): This algorithm takes as input the client database size
N and generates a client local state s and a server database
sizeM .
GenAP(s, id): This algorithm gets as input a client state s and a
client block identifier id ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, and outputs an access
pattern P ∈ {1, . . . ,N }2×n , which is a sequence of server
block location pairs, and a new client local state s ′.
GetId(s, i): This algorithm gets as input a client state s and a
server block location i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and outputs the corre-
sponding client block identifier id ∈ {1, . . . ,N }.
An ORAM is used as follows to store and access a database of
size N . First, the client runs algorithm Setup(N ) → (s,M) and
initializes the server database with M data blocks. To access (i.e.,
read or write) block id ∈ {1, . . . ,N } at the server, the client first
computes GenAP(s, id) → (P , s ′) and updates its local state s ← s ′.
Then it accesses the server database according to the access pattern
P = [(i1, j1), . . . , (in , jn )], as follows. For every block location pair
(i, j) ∈ P , it first retrieves block i . Then, it checks if GetId(s, i) = id
and if this is the cae processes the data. Afterwards, it stores the
block at the new location j.
An ORAM is secure if the access patterns generated by GenAP
are indindistinguishable from each other. In the security experiment
(Algorithm 2.1), an adversary can instruct the client to access blocks
of its choice and then sees the induced access patterns. In order
to break the security, the adversary has to distinguish the access
patterns of two access instructions of its choice.
Definition 2.1 (ORAM Security). An oblivious RAM ORAM is infor-
mation theoretically secure if for any integer N and probabilistic
algorithm A,
Pr
[
ExpAPHORAM,N (A) = 1
]
=
1
2 .
3 DESCRIPTION OF PROPYLA
In this section, we describe our new long-term secure storage ar-
chitecture PROPYLA, which is the first storage architecture that
provides long-term integrity, long-term confidentiality, and long-
term access pattern hiding.
3.1 Overview
PROPYLA comprises the following components: a client, an in-
tegrity system, which consists of an evidence service and times-
tamp service, and a confidentiality system, which consists of a set
of shareholders (Figure 1).
Algorithm 1: The ORAM access pattern hiding experiment
ExpAPHORAM,N (A).
(s,M) ← ORAM.Setup(N );
(id1, id2) ← AClient(M);
b ← PickRandom({1, 2});
P ← Client(idb );
b ′ ← AClient(P);
if b=b’ then
return 1;
else
return 0;
oracle Client(id):
(s, P) ← ORAM.GenAP(s, id);
return P ;
Client
Integrity System
Confidentiality System
Shareholders
Evidence
Service
Timestamp
Service
Figure 1: Overview of the storage architecture PROPYLA.
We assume that the client stores a database D that consists of N
data blocks that have equal length:
D = [dat1, dat2, . . . , datN ] .
The data is stored at the shareholders using secret sharing, where
each block is shared separately. Integrity protection of the data
blocks is achieved by maintaining for each data block i an evidence
block Ei . An evidence block Ei has the form
Ei = [(opi,1, ci,1,di,1, tsi,1), (opi,2, ci,2,di,2, tsi,2), . . .]
and describes a history of operations that have been performed on
the block. For an element (opi, j , ci, j ,di, j , tsi, j ) of such an evidence
block Ei , the first element opi, j ∈ {‘Write’, ‘Read’, ‘ReCom’, ‘ReTs’}
describes the operation type that has been performed, and the ele-
ments ci, j , di, j , and tsi, j refer to the commitment, decommitment,
and timestamp, which have been generated during that operation.
Here, the commitments and timestamps form a chain, where later
commitments and timestamps guarantee the validity of earlier com-
mitments and timestamps. The evidence is partially stored at the ev-
idence service and partially stored at the shareholders. The newest
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part of the evidence is stored at the evidence service so that the
timestamps can be renewed by the evidence service without the
help of the data owner.
To achieve access pattern hiding, the client makes accesses to
the evidence service and the storage servers using an information
theoretically secure ORAM. Therefore, the evidence service and the
shareholders store a database consisting ofM > N blocks, where
M is determined by the choice of the ORAM. The additionalM −N
blocks provide the client with the necessary storage space so that it
can reshuffle and access the data such that a uniform distribution of
accesses over the server blocks is achieved. In order to preserve the
access pattern hiding property, there must also be no correlation
between the transmitted data of any two blocks. Typically, this is
achived by re-encrypting the data on every access. In our solution,
however, this technique cannot be applied because the evidence
service must receive the commitments in plaintext so that it can
timestamp them in order to renew the integrity protection. Instead,
we use a recommitment technique to refresh the commitments: we
let the client commit to the previous commitment and timestamp.
Thereby, a new commitment is obtained that is indistinguishable
from other fresh commitments while the connection to the origi-
nally timestamped commitment is maintained.
3.2 Protocols
In the following we describe the protocols used in PROPYLA for
initializing the system, accessing and protecting the data, renewing
the protection, and integrity verification.
Throughout the description of the protocols we use the follow-
ing notation. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and commitment c , we write
ES.Write(i, c) to denote that the client instructs the evidence ser-
vice to store commitment c at block i . Furthermore, we write
EES ← ES.Read(i) to denote that the client retrieves evidence
EES of block i from the evidence service. Likewise, we denote
by SH .Write(i, (dat,E)) that the client stores data dat and evi-
dence E to block i at the shareholders using protocol SHARE.Share
and we write (dat,E) ← SH .Read(i) to denote that the client
retrieves dat and E of block i from the shareholders using proto-
col SHARE.Reconstruct, where SHARE is the secret sharing scheme
chosen by the client in the initialization phase. For a data object
dat, we write ts ← TS.Stamp(dat) to denote that a timestamp
ts for dat is obtained from timestamp service TS. Likewise, we
write (c,d) ← CSI.Commit(dat) to denote that a commitment and
decommitment are generated for dat using commitment scheme
instanceCSI. Throughout our description, we assume that the times-
tamp services are initialized appropriately using algorithm Setup
of the corresponding timestamp scheme. Similarly, we assume that
commitment scheme instances are initialized by a trusted third
party using algorithm Setup of the corresponding commitment
scheme. Also, we use the following notation for lists. We write [] to
denote an empty list. For a list E = [x1, . . . ,xn ] and i ∈ {1, . . . ,n},
by E[i :] we denote the sublist [xi , . . . ,xn ], by E[: −i] we denote
the sublist [x1, . . . ,xn−i+1], and by E[−i] we denote the element
xn−i+1.
3.2.1 Initialization. At initialization, the client chooses a secret
sharing scheme SHARE, an ORAM scheme ORAM, and a database
size N . It then initializes the ORAM via (s,M) ← ORAM.Setup(N )
and allocates a database with M blocks at the evidence service. For
each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the evidence service initializes block i with an
empty evidence lists, EES,i = []. Afterwards, the client picks a set
of secret share holders and a reconstruction threshold, and then
initializes the secret sharing database withM blocks using protocol
SHARE.Setup. The shareholders initialize their databases such that
for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} an empty data object dati = ⊥ and an
empty evidence list Ei = [] is stored at block i . We remark that
while we use a stash-free ORAM model for the benefit of a more
comprehensible description, the construction can be adopted to
work with stashed ORAMs in which case the client locally manages
the stashed items as usual.
3.2.2 Read and Write. The client reads and writes data blocks
using algorithm Access (see Algorithm 2). This algorithm gets as
input an operation type op ∈ {‘Write’, ‘Read’}, a block identifier
id ∈ {1, . . . ,N }, optionally data to be written dat′, the ORAM
state s , a commitment scheme instance CSI, and a reference to a
timestamp service TS. It then generates an access pattern, (P , s) ←
ORAM.GenAP(s, id), and for each (ik , jk ) ∈ P does the following: first,
it retrieves the new evidence EES for block ik from the evidence
service and it retrieves the stored data dat and the old evidence E
from the shareholders. Then the new evidence EES is added to the
shareholder evidence E. If this is a write operation (op = ‘Write’)
and ORAM.GetId(s, ik ) = id, then the block data dat is replaced with
dat′ and a commitment (c,d) to the new data is generated. Since
this block is newly written, the existing evidence is discarded and
the corresponding evidence is set to E = [(‘Write’, c,d,⊥)], where
⊥ is a placeholder for the timestamp that will later be retrieved by
the evidence service. If this is a read operation (op = ‘Read’) and
ORAM.GetId(s, ik ) = id, then the data dat is cached and returned
when the access algorithm finishes. Finally, the algorithm refreshes
the commitment by creating a new commitment to the block data
and the previous commitment. This is necessary so that the evi-
dence service cannot trace how the client rearranges the blocks.
The refreshed commitment is stored at the evidence service at the
new location jk . The evidence service then timestamps the new
commitment and stores the timestamp together with the commit-
ment (Algorithm 3). Also, the client generates new secret shares
of the data dat and the shareholder evidence E and stores them at
the shareholders at the new location jk . As the secret shares are
newly generated, they do not correlate with the old shares and their
relocation cannot be traced either.
3.2.3 Renew Timestamps. If the security of the currently used
timestamp scheme is threatened, the evidence service renews the
evidence as follows (Algorithm 4). It picks a new timestamp service
TS that uses a more secure timestamp scheme and then for every
i ∈ [1, . . . ,M], it first creates a commitment (c ′,d ′) to the last com-
mitment and timestamp stored in EES,i , then requests a timestamp
ts for c ′, and finally adds (‘ReTs’, c ′,d ′, ts) to EES,i .
3.2.4 Renew Commitments. If the security of the currently used
commitment scheme is threatened, the client renews the evidence
using Algorithm 5. It starts by selecting a new commitment scheme
instance CSI. Then, for each block i ∈ [1, . . . ,M], it does the fol-
lowing. It first retrieves the new evidence EES,i from the evidence
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Algorithm 2: Access(op, id, dat′, s,CSI,TS), run by the
client.
([(i1, j1), . . . , (in , jn )], s ′) ← ORAM.GenAP(id);
for k = 1, . . . ,n do
// process k-th entry in access pattern
EES ← ES.Read(ik ); (dat,E) ← SH .Read(ik ); // read
data from location ik
E[−1].ts← EES[1].ts; E += EES[2 :]; // move
evidence from ES to SH
if op = ‘Write’ and T (ik ) = id then
dat← dat′; (c,d) ← CSI.Commit(dat′);
E = [(‘Write’, c,d,⊥)]; // write and commit new
data, discard old evidence
else if op = ‘Read’ and T (ik ) = id then
dat′′ ← dat; E ′′ ← E; // save for output later
if op , ‘Write’ or T (ik ) , id then
// refresh commitments
if E[−1].op = ‘Read’ then
E ← E[: −2];
(c,d) ← CSI.Commit([E[−1].c,E[−1].ts]);
E += [(‘Read’, c,d,⊥)];
ES.Write(jk ,E[−1].c,TS); SH .Write(jk , (dat,E));
// write data to location jk
return (s ′, dat′′,E ′′);
Algorithm 3: ES.Write(i, c,TS), run by the evidence service.
ts← TS.Stamp(c);
EES,i ← [(⊥, c,⊥, ts)];
Algorithm 4: RenewTs(CSI,TS), run by the evidence service.
for i = 1 toM do
(ci ,di ) ← CSI.Commit([EES,i [−1].c,EES,i [−1].ts]);
tsi ← TS.Stamp(ci );
EES,i += [(‘ReTs’, ci ,di , tsi )];
service and data block dati and old evidence block Ei from the share-
holders. It then adds the new evidence EES,i to the shareholder
evidence Ei . Afterwards, it creates a new commitment (ci ,di ) to the
secret data dati and the evidence Ei . It then adds (‘ReCom’, ci ,di ,⊥)
to Ei . Finally, it sends ci to the evidence service and distributes dati
and Ei to the shareholders.
3.2.5 Share Renewal. In regular time intervals the shareholders
renew the stored shares to protect against a mobile adversary (see
Section 2.3) by running protocol SHARE.Reshare.
3.2.6 Verification. The verification algorithm (Algorithm 6) uses
a trust anchor TA that certifies the validity of public keys for time-
stamps and commitments. Here, by VerTsTA(dat, ts; tver) = 1 we
denote that timestamp ts is valid for dat at reference time tver,
Algorithm 5: RenewCom(CSI,TS), run by the client.
for i = 1, . . . ,M do
EES ← ES.Read(i); (dat,E) ← SH .Read(i);
// retrieve data from location i
E[−1].ts← EES[1].ts; E += EES[2 :]; // move
evidence from ES to SH
(c,d) ← CSI.Commit([dat,E]); // recommit to data
and evidence
E += [(‘ReCom’, c,d,⊥)]; // add new evidence
ES.Write(i,E[−1].c,TS);
SH .Write(i, (dat,E)) ; // store evidence and data
at location i
and by VerComTA(dat, c,d ; tver) = 1 we denote that d is a valid
decommitment from c to dat at time tver. On input a data object
dat, a time t , an evidence block E, and the verification time tver,
the verification algorithm of PROPYLA checks whether E is cur-
rently valid evidence for the existence of dat at time t , given that
the current time is tver. In particular, the algorithm checks that the
evidence is constructed correctly for dat, that the timestamps and
commitments have been valid at their renewal time, and that the
first timestamp refers to time t .
Algorithm 6: VerIntTA(dat, t ,E; tver), run by any verifier.
/* verifies that dat existed at time t */
Let E = [(op1, c1,d1, ts1), . . . , (opn , cn ,dn , tsn )];
Set tn+1 := tver;
For i ∈ [n], set Ei := [(op1, c1,d1, ts1), . . . , (opi , ci ,di , tsi )];
For i ∈ [n], set ti := tsi .t ;
For i ∈ [n], set
tNRC(i) := min({tj | actj = ‘ReCom’ ∧ j > i} ∪ {tn+1});
for i = n to 1 do
Assert VerTsTA(ci , tsi ; ti+1) = 1;
if opi = ‘Write’ and i = 1 then
Assert VerComTA(dat, c1,d1; tNRC(1)) = 1;
else if opi = ‘Read’ or opi = ‘ReTs’ then
Assert VerComTA([ci−1, tsi−1], ci ,di ; tNRC(i)) = 1;
else if opi = ‘ReCom’ then
Assert VerComTA([dat,Ei−1], ci ,di ; tNRC(i)) = 1;
else
Fail;
Assert ts1.t = t ;
4 SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section we analyze the security of PROPYLA. Our security
analysis requires a model of real time which is used for expressing
the scheduling of protection renewal events in our security experi-
ments and for expressing computational bounds on the adversary
with respect to real time. We first describe our model of real time.
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Then, we show that PROPYLA provides long-term access pattern
hiding, long-term confidentiality, and long-term integrity.
4.1 Model of Time
For modeling the security of PROPYLA, we want to be able to ex-
press that certain events (e.g., renewal of timestamps) are performed
according to a timed schedule. Concretely, in the security analysis
of PROPYLA, we consider a renewal schedule S that describes at
which times, and using which schemes the timestamp and com-
mitment renewals are performed. Additionally, our computational
model allows to capture that an adversary becomes computation-
ally more powerful over time (e.g., it gets access to a quantum
computer).
We model real time as proposed in [11], i.e., we use a global clock
that advances whenever the adversary performs work. Formally,
in a security experiment with an adversary A, we assume a global
clock Clock with a local state time determining the current time in
the experiment. The adversary A is given the ability to advance
time by calling Clock(t), i.e., at time = t , it may call Clock(t ′)
and set the time to time = t ′, for any t ′ with t ′ > t . When this
happens, all actions scheduled between times t and t ′ are performed
in order and afterwards the control is given back to the adversary.
We remark that the adversary also uses up his computational power
when it advances time. This is due to the fact that we restrict it to
perform only a bounded number of operations per time interval. Our
computational model also captures adversaries who increase their
computational power over time. For more details on the adversary
model we refer the reader to [6].
4.2 Long-Term Access Pattern Hiding
In the following we prove that PROPYLA achieves information
theoretically secure access pattern hiding against the evidence
service and the shareholders if the used ORAM, secret sharing
scheme, and commitment schemes are information theoretically
secure.
Formally, Access-Pattern-Hiding (APH) Security of PROPYLA is
defined via game ExpAPHPROPYLA (Algorithm 7), where an adversary,A, instructs the client of PROPYLA to read and write database
blocks at logical addresses chosen by the adversary. During these
data accesses, A observes the data that is transferred between
the client and the evidence service and a subset of less than the
threshold number of shareholders. At some point in time, A gives
two different access instructions to the client. The client picks one
of them at random and executes it. The goal of the adversaryA is to
infer from the observed data streamwhich of the access instructions
has been executed by the client.
For PROPYLA to be information theoretically secure access pat-
tern hiding, it must hold that for any timestamp and commitment
renewal schedule S, a computationally unbounded adversary is not
able to infer with probability other than 12 which access instruction
was made.
Definition 4.1 (APH-Security of PROPYLA). PROPYLA is infor-
mation theoretically APH-secure if for any renewal schedule S and
any adversary A:
Pr
[
ExpAPHPROPYLA(S,A) = 1
]
=
1
2 .
Algorithm 7: ExpAPHPROPYLA(S,A)
((op1, id1, dat1), (op2, id2, dat2)) ← AClock,Client();
b ← PickRandom({1, 2});
VIEW← Client(opb , idb , datb );
b ′ ← AClock,Client(VIEW);
if b = b ′ then
return 1;
else
return 0;
oracle Clock(t):
if t > time then
Perform all renewals scheduled in S between time and t ;
time← t ;
oracle Client(op, id, dat):
PROPYLA.Access(op, id, dat);
Let VIEW denote the data received by the evidence service
and a subset of less than the threshold number of sharehold-
ers during the execution of PROPYLA.Access;
return VIEW;
Theorem 4.2. If PROPYLA is instantiated using an information
theoretically secure ORAM, information theoretically hiding commit-
ment schemes, and information theoretically secure secret sharing,
then it provides information theoretic APH-security.
Proof. We observe that the queries made by the client and ob-
served by the adversary are either of the form (i, c), when the client
instructs the evidence service to store commitment c at database
location i , or of the form (i, s), when the client instructs a share-
holder to store share s at location i . Furthermore, we observe that
when using an information theoretically secure ORAM, there is no
statistical correlation between the instructions (op, id, dat) chosen
by the adversary and the database locations i sent by the client.
There is also no statistical correlation between the data and the
commitments c or the secret shares s , as long as the adversary ob-
serves less than the threshold number of shareholders. This is (1)
because we use information theoretically hiding commitments and
information theoretically secure secret sharing and (2) the shares
and the commitments are renewed on every access.
As there is no statistical correlation between the accesses made
by the client and the transmitted data, even a computationally un-
bounded adversary cannot infer which of the challenge instructions
(op1, id1, dat1) and (op2, id2, dat2) was executed. □
4.3 Long-Term Confidentiality
Informally, long-term confidentiality of PROPYLAmeans that even
an unbounded evidence service and a subset of colluding unbounded
shareholders cannot learn anything about the content of the stored
data. More formally, we require that there is no significant sta-
tistical correlation between the data stored by the client and the
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data observed by the evidence service and a subset of sharehold-
ers. We observe that this property immediately follows from the
information-theoretic access pattern hiding security of PROPYLA.
4.4 Long-Term Integrity
Next, we show that PROPYLA provides long-term integrity protec-
tion. Here we consider an adversary that may be running for a very
long time but who can only perform a limited amount of work per
unit of time (see the adversary model description in Section 4.1).
The goal of the adversary is to prove that a data object existed at
a certain point in time when in reality it did not exist. To capture
this notion more formally, we need to define what it means that a
data object existed. Here, when we say that a data object dat existed
at time t with respect to an adversary A, we mean that A “knew”
dat at time t (with high probability). This can be formalized using
computational extractors (e.g., [6, 9, 11]). Our security analysis is
based on [6, 11], where it is shown that (under certain computa-
tional assumptions) extractable commitments and timestamps can
be used to argue about the knowledge of an adversary at a given
point in time. Based on these results, we here give a slightly less
technical security proof for the integrity of PROPYLA.
In our security analysis we use the following notation to describe
the knowledge of an adversary A. For a data object dat and a time
t , we write dat ∈ KA [t] to denote that A knew dat at time t . We
assume without loss of generality that adversaries do not forget
knowledge, that is, for any data object dat and any two points in
time t and t ′, if dat ∈ KA [t] and t ′ > t , then dat ∈ KA [t ′]. We
also use the convention that for verification of timestamps and com-
mitments a trust anchor TA is provided by a PKI that certifies the
verification keys of the used timestamp and commitment scheme
instances and specifies the corresponding instance validity periods.
We state two lemmas that will be useful for proving long-term
integrity protection of PROPYLA. These lemmas are derived from
results of [6, 11] about extractable timestamps and commitments.
The first lemma states that if an adversary A knows a timestamp
ts and a message m at a time t , and ts is valid for m at t , then
A has already knownm at time ts.t (with high probability). The
second lemma states that if an adversary A knows a commitment
value at a time t , a messagem and a decommitment d are known
at time t ′ > t , and d is a valid decommitment at time t ′, then A
has already known the messagem at the commitment time t (with
high probability).
Lemma 4.3. For any messagem, timestamp ts, and time t :
(m, ts) ∈ KA [t] ∧ VerTsTA(m, ts; t) = 1 =⇒ m ∈ KA [ts.t] .
Lemma 4.4. For any commitment value c , time t , messagem, de-
commitment value d , and time t ′ > t :
c ∈ KA [t] ∧ (m,d) ∈ KA [t ′] ∧ VerComTA(m, c,d ; t ′) = 1
=⇒ m ∈ KA [t] .
Next, we use Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4 to show that PROPYLA
provides long-term integrity protection.
Theorem 4.5. PROPYLA provides long-term integrity protection,
that is, it is infeasible for an adversary to produce evidence E valid
for data dat and time t without having known dat at time t given
that the used timestamp and commitment schemes are secure within
their usage period.
Proof. Assume an adversaryA outputs (dat, t ,E) at some point
in time tn+1 and that TA is the trust anchor provided by the PKI at
that time. We show that if E is valid evidence for data dat and time
t (i.e., VerIntTA(dat, t ,E) = 1), then the adversary did know dat at
time t (with high probability).
Let E = [(op1, c1,d1, ts1), . . . , (opn , cn ,dn , tsn )] without loss of
generality. Then, for i ∈ [1, . . . ,n], define Ei = [(op1, c1,d1, ts1),
. . . , (opi , ci ,di , tsi )], ti = tsi .t , and tNRC(i) as the time of the next
commitment renewal after commitment ci . Additionally, we define
tNRC(n) = tn+1. In the following, we show recursively that for
i ∈ [n, . . . , 1], statement
St(i) : (ci , tsi ) ∈ KA [ti+1] ∧ (dat,Ei ) ∈ KA [tNRC(i)]
holds, that is, commitment value ci and timestamp tsi are known at
the next timestamp time ti+1 and the data dat and partial evidence
Ei are known at the next commitment renewal time tNRC(i).
Statement St(n) obviously holds because (dat,E) is output by the
adversary at time tn+1 and includes cn , tsn , dat, and En . Next, we
show for i ∈ {n, . . . , 2}, that VerIntTA(dat, t ,E) = 1 and St(i) im-
plies St(i − 1). By the definition of VerInt (Algorithm 6) we observe
that VerIntTA(dat, t ,E) = 1 implies VerTsTA(ci , tsi ; ti+1) = 1, that is,
tsi is valid for commitment ci at time ti+1. Furthermore, we observe
that St(i) implies (ci , tsi ) ∈ KA [ti+1], which means that ci and tsi
were known at time ti+1. We can now apply Lemma 4.3 to obtain
that commitment ci was known at time ti (i.e., ci ∈ KA [ti ]). Next,
we distinguish between the case opi ∈ {‘Read’, ‘ReTs’} and the
case opi ∈ {‘ReCom’}. We observe that if opi ∈ {‘Read’, ‘ReTs’},
then VerComTA(ci−1∥tsi−1, ci ,di ; tNRC(i)) = 1 and by Lemma 4.4 it
follows that (ci−1, tsi−1) ∈ KA [ti ] (i.e., ci−1 and tsi−1 were known
at time ti ). If opi ∈ {‘ReCom’}, then VerComTA(dat∥Ei−1, ci ,di ;
tNRC(i)) = 1 and it follows that (dat,Ei−1) ∈ KA [tNRC(i−1)]. To-
gether, we obtain that if VerIntTA(dat, t ,E) = 1 and St(i), then
St(i − 1) holds. By induction over i it follows that St(1) holds.
Finally, we observe that St(1) by Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.4
implies dat ∈ KA [t1]. Also, VerIntTA(dat, t ,E) = 1 implies t1 = t ,
and thus we obtain dat ∈ KA [t]. We conclude that if the adversary
presents (dat, t ,E) such that VerIntTA(dat, t ,E) = 1, then it must
have known dat at time t . □
5 INSTANTIATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we describe an instantiation of PROPYLA and ana-
lyze its performance.
5.1 Scheme Instantiation
We instantiate PROPYLA using Path-ORAM [29], Shamir Secret
Sharing [25], Halevi-Micali Commitments [16], RSA Signatures
[24], and XMSS Signatures [5]. The implementation has been done
in Java and we use the following parameters. For Path-ORAM
we use a bucket size of 5. Our implementation of Halevi-Micali
Commitments uses the hash functions SHA-224, SHA-256, and SHA-
384 [22]. For RSA, we use the standard JDK implementation and
use SHA-224 with RSA-2048. For XMSS, we use the implementation
from the Bouncy Castle Library [30], which supports the hash
functions SHA-256 and SHA-512, and we use a tree height of 10.
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Table 1: Overview of the used commitment and signature
scheme instances and their usage period.
Years Signatures Commitments
2018-2030 RSA-2048 HM-224
2031-2066 XMSS-256 HM-224
2067-2091 XMSS-256 HM-256
2091-2118 XMSS-512 HM-384
This instantiation has the required security properties. Path
ORAM instantiated with an information theoretically secure ran-
dom number generator (e.g., a quantum-based random number gen-
erator [27]) provides information theoretic security [28]. Shamir
Secret Sharing and Halevi-Micali Commitments are information
theoretic hiding. Therefore, by Theorem 4.2, the described instanti-
ation of PROPYLA is information theoretic access pattern hiding.
Information theoretic confidentiality also follows from Theorem 4.2
(see Section 4.3). Finally, by Theorem 4.5, long-term integrity is
achieved as long as the used commitment and signature scheme
instances are secure within their usage period. In Table 1 we list the
commitment and signature scheme instances that we use together
with their usage periods, which are based on the predictions by
Lenstra and Verheul [2, 19, 20]. Also, we assume that quantum
computers will become a considerable threat by 2040 and there-
fore transition from RSA Signatures (which are known vulnerable
to quantum computers) to XMSS Signatures (which are expected
secure against quantum computer attacks) after 2030.
5.2 Evaluation
5.2.1 Scenario. In the following we examine a use case where
a client stores N data objects of size L for a time period of 100
years using PROPYLA with 3 shareholders. To maintain long-term
integrity protection, timestamps are renewed every 2 years, which
corresponds to the typical lifetime of a public key certificate, and
commitments are renewed every 10 years, which corresponds to
the longer lifetime of commitments because they do not involve any
secret parameters that could compromise security. Cryptographic
schemes in PROPYLA are instantiated as described in Section 5.1.
Computation times of PROPYLA are estimated by counting the
number of the involved primitive operations (e.g., commitments,
timestamps) and multiplying these numbers by the running time
of the respective operations, which were measured on a computer
with a 2.9GHz Intel Core i5 CPU. We remark that our performance
analysis does not consider network latency.
5.2.2 Results. We now present the results of our performance
evaluation focusing on the costs of enabling long-term integrity
protection. In particular, we measure the costs for generating, com-
municating, and storing timestamps and commitments.
In Figure 2, we show the space required for storing commitments,
decommitments, and timestamps.We observe that the storage space
required per shareholder increases with each commitment renewal
and that the magnitude of the increase depends on the commitment
and signature scheme parameters. With respect to the evidence ser-
vice we observe that the required storage space increases with each
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Figure 2: Storage costs for timestamps and commitments per
server block (independent of block size L).
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Figure 3: Computation time for renewing timestamps and
commitments when storing N ∈ {28, 212, 216} data objects of
size L = 100kB.
timestamp renewal and is reset with each commitment renewal,
when commitments and timestamps are moved to the shareholders.
The storage space required for integrity protection is independent
of the data block size because commitment and signature sizes are
independent of the data size. After 100 years, about 50 kB of storage
per block is required at the evidence service and about 150 kB at a
shareholder.
In Figure 3, we show the computation time required for renewing
timestamps and commitments for database size N ∈ {28, 212, 216}
and data block size L = 100kB. We observe that the renewal time
scales linearly with the number of data objects and depends on
the commitment and signature scheme parameters. Renewing the
protection after 100 years takes about 1min for N = 28 data objects
and 256min for N = 216 data objects.
In Figure 4, we show the computation time required for gener-
ating commitments and timestamps during one database access
made by the client for database size N ∈ {28, 212, 216} and block
size L = 100kB. We observe that the computation cost scales loga-
rithmically with the database size N , which is because Path-ORAM
requires log(N ) server accesses per client access. Furthermore, we
observe that the computation cost also significantly depends on
the commitment and timestamp scheme parameters. Concretely,
the computation cost per access ranges from about 0.3 s in 2018 for
N = 28 and about 3.7 s in 2118 for N = 216.
In Figure 5 we show the communication cost for the client per
database access for ORAM-SS, which is a combination of ORAM
and Secret Sharing without long-term integrity protection, and
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Figure 4: Computation time for generating timestamps and
commitments per database access for database size N ∈
{28, 212, 216} and block size L = 100kB.
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Figure 5: Communication cost for the client per database ac-
cess for database size N = 212 and block size L = 100kB.
PROPYLA. For N = 212 and L = 100kB we observe that the com-
munication overhead for adding long-term integrity protection
ranges between 0.06% in year 2018 and 259% in 2118. The reason
is that over time evidence is accumulated which needs to be com-
municated on every access. The communication cost per database
access scales logarithmically with the database size N and linearly
with the number of protection renewals. It also depends on the
commitment and timestamp scheme parameters.
6 CONCLUSIONS
We presented the first long-term secure storage architecture that
combines long-term integrity, long-term confidentiality, and long-
term access pattern hiding protection. Overall, our performance
measurements show that these protection goals can be achieved
with manageable communication, computation, and storage costs.
The storage and communication cost per block and per storage
server is independent of the block size L. The computation and
communication costs are logarithmic in the database size N and
also depend on the amount of accumulated evidence. The protection
renewal time is linear in N .
We envision that the performance of PROPYLA can further be
improved by using Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) [21] in order to
reduce the number of timestamps as follows. During timestamp
and commitment renewal, instead of timestamping each data block
separately, one could first create a MHT for the entire database and
then timestamp only the root of that tree. While asymptotically this
increases the storage and computation complexity from O(N ) to
O(N log(N )), we expect that concrete computation costs decrease
because typical hash functions are much faster to evaluate than
the signing algorithms used for timestamping. Furhtermore, hash
values are also much smaller in size compared to signatures. We
leave the exact description, implementation, and evaluation of this
approach for future work.
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VERSION HISTORY
The following changes have been made since the proceedings ver-
sion:
• November 2018: An error in the description of the commit-
ment renewal procedure in Algorithm 2 has been fixed. The
analysis of the communication cost in Section 5 has been
revised and now shows the total communication cost for the
client.
• April 2019: The number of shareholders was not specified in
the evaluation and has been added.
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